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Legal Profession Act 2007 – entitlement to itemised bill – meaning of “client” – meaning of “third 
party payer” - whether beneficiary entitled to seek costs assessment order against trustee’s 
solicitor – whether beneficiary had legal obligation to pay costs. 
Two recent decisions in the Supreme Court of Queensland have considered the scope of some of the 
provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (“the Act”), including the definition of “third party 
payer” in s 301 of the Act. 
Legal Services Commissioner v Wright [2010] QSC 168 
Facts 
The respondent solicitor (“the respondent”) acted for Mr Anderson in proceedings flowing from the 
breakdown of his de facto relationship with Ms Anderson. This included a proceeding in the District 
Court under Part 19 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld).  
The parties reached an agreement that led to the making of a consent order in the District Court on 
12 August 2008. The order provided for the sale of real property registered in Mr Anderson’s name, 
and the distribution of the net proceeds in the proportions of 75% to Ms Anderson and 25% to Mr 
Anderson.  The order further provided: “D M Wright and Associates will act on the Respondent’s (Mr 
Anderson’s) behalf in the conveyance of the sale of the property.”  Various amounts were to be paid 
under the order, including all costs and expenses of the sale, with the balance to be paid 75% to Ms 
Anderson and 25% to Mr Anderson. 
The respondent charged $7,179.76 for “legal fees associated with the sale”. Ms Anderson sought an 
itemised bill of costs under s. 332 of the Act. This was refused on the basis that Ms Anderson was 
not the respondent’s client or a third party payer. 
Ms Anderson lodged a complaint with the Legal Services Commissioner.  The Commissioner filed an 
originating application seeking declarations that Ms Anderson was a client of the respondent, or a 
third party payer in relation to Mr Anderson, or was otherwise entitled to apply for an assessment of 
the costs. 
Legislation 
Section 335 of the Act grants an entitlement to apply for an assessment of the whole or any part of 
legal costs to “a client”, and to a “third party payer” in relation to any such costs payable by the third 
party payer. 
Section 332 enables any person who is entitled to apply for an assessment of legal costs to which a 
lump sum bill relates to request the law practice to give the person an itemised bill. The law practice 
must comply with the request within 28 days after the date on which the request is made. 
“Client” is defined in s 334 to mean “a person to whom or for whom legal services are or have been 
provided.” 
Section 301 of the Act defines “third party payer”. It provides, so far as relevant: 
(1) A person is a third party payer, in relation to a client of a law practice, if the person is not the 
client, and –  
(a) is under a legal obligation to pay all or any part of the legal costs for legal services 
provided to the client; or 
(b) being under that obligation, has already paid all or a part of those legal costs. 
… 
(4) A legal obligation mentioned in subsection (1) can arise by or under contract or legislation or 
otherwise. 
… 
Analysis 
It was submitted for the Commissioner that the respondent had provided legal services to Ms 
Anderson, and that she was “a client” of the respondent.  It was argued that in receiving the fund of 
money on the sale of the property and purporting to distribute it according to the court order, the 
respondent took on the role of solicitor for Ms Anderson, so that an implied retainer arose.  
The Chief Justice concluded that no implied retainer arose.  Among the factors his Honour regarded 
as persuasive was the specification in the consent order that the respondent would be acting on Mr 
Anderson’s behalf “in the conveyance of the sale of the property”; that Ms Anderson was separately 
represented by other solicitors at the time of the consent order, and there was no suggestion those 
solicitors would cease to act; and the prospect of conflict of interest if the respondent’s firm were to 
be acting for both parties.  
His Honour accepted it would be unsatisfactory if Ms Anderson was left with no capacity to pursue a 
challenge to the respondent’s account, but noted that there were other avenues for relief. These 
included the possibility that if the amount of the bill of costs were unreasonable, it was likely Ms 
Anderson could bring a proceeding against Mr Anderson for an accounting in respect of this excess. 
Another possible avenue would be for Ms Anderson to request the Legal Services Commissioner to 
exercise his power under the complaint to require production of the itemised bill, which could lead 
to a proceeding for an order for compensation. 
An alternative submission for the Commissioner was that Ms Anderson was a “third party payer” as 
defined in s 301 of the Act. This argument was also rejected.  The Chief Justice accepted  that under 
the consent order Ms Anderson was under a legal obligation to discharge certain expenses of the 
sale, including the respondent’s costs, but the Chief Justice found that legal obligation to be owed to 
Mr Anderson. His Honour said (at [26]-[28]): 
[26] The order obliges Mr Anderson and Ms Anderson to apply the proceeds of sale first in 
payment of costs. The legal costs were primarily payable by Mr Anderson, because the 
respondent, entitled to the payment, was his solicitor. Mr Anderson presumably remained 
primarily liable notwithstanding the court order, to which the respondent was not a party.  
[27] All that has happened is that as between Ms Anderson and Mr Anderson, there has 
been agreement about how the costs will be paid, which would result in Ms Anderson 
bearing three-quarters of them and Mr Anderson one-quarter.  
[28] But by force of the court order, Ms Anderson undertook no legal obligation vis –a –vis 
the respondent , and that is I believe the sort of obligation which section 301 has in mind. 
Order 
As it was not suggested there was any basis for an application for assessment other than Ms 
Anderson being a client of the respondent or a third party payer, the application was dismissed.  
Amos v Ian K Fry & Company [2010] QCA 131 
Facts 
A number of proceedings had been conducted, to which Edward Amos (Amos) and his brother (“the 
executor”), who was the executor and trustee of their late father’s estate, were parties.  The two 
brothers and their sister were the beneficiaries of the estate.  
In proceedings in the Supreme Court relating to the administration of the estate, an order had been 
made requiring Amos to pay the “unnecessary costs of the administration of the estate” flowing 
from the conduct of Amos. The order also provided for the sale of the main asset of the estate, with 
the executor to then deduct the costs payable to Ian K Fry and Company (“the solicitor”), who had 
been retained by the executor, from Amos’ share of the estate of the proceeds of sale, and to pay 
those costs to the solicitor.  
Amos sought leave to commence proceedings for a costs assessment order against the solicitor in 
respect of invoices prepared by the solicitor for costs. That application was dismissed.  Lyons J held 
that Amos was not a third party payer as defined in the Act, because he had no legal obligation to 
pay the costs and therefore was not entitled to an order that the costs be assessed. Amos filed a 
notice of appeal from this order.  
The solicitor then brought an application seeking a number of orders, including orders that the 
appeal be dismissed or stayed permanently, or alternatively, that it be struck out as vexatious and an 
abuse of process and as disclosing no prospect of success. One of the issues to be considered on the 
application was whether Amos had standing to seek a costs order. 
Analysis 
It was submitted for Amos that by virtue of the order authorising the deduction of the solicitor’s 
costs from the share of the estate otherwise payable to Amos, Amos became a third party payer of 
the solicitor’s fees “absolute”. This was said to be because nothing was distributed to him under his 
late father’s will but his share went to pay the solicitor’s bill of costs.  
White JA was referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Short Punch & 
Greatorix [2000] QCA 407. In that case Equuscorp Pty Ltd was the owner of the majority of the units 
in a unit trust and brought proceedings against the trustee and the manager of the trust. Each of the 
trust and manager retained firms of solicitors who rendered bills of costs to their respective client. 
Equuscorp sought to challenge those bills under the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (Qld). The 
Chief Justice held that the words “liable to pay” as appearing in the definition of “client” in section 3 
of that Act carried their usual meaning. His Honour concluded that the ownership of the units 
created no liability to pay the solicitor’s costs. 
In considering the judgments in Equuscorp, White JA noted the observation of McPherson JA in that 
case that s 31 of the Costs Act 1867 (Qld) (repealed) had given a right to a beneficiary or other 
person interested in property out of which costs were paid or to be payable, to obtain an order for 
taxation.  His Honour had suggested that provision may have been “inadvertently” omitted.  White 
JA said, however (at [44]): “If that were so, the legislature has had ample opportunity since the 1952 
Act and the decision in Equuscorp to insert such an enabling provision but has not.” 
White JA was satisfied the solicitor, were he minded to do so, could not recover his costs incurred in 
work for the estate from a beneficiary, and that Amos was not legally liable to pay the solicitor’s 
costs. Her Honour said the status of Amos as a beneficiary was not altered by the earlier orders. It 
was the executor/trustee who had approved the solicitor’s bill of costs for the costs authorised by 
the court to be deducted from Amos’ share of the estate, and it was to him Amos should have 
looked.  
Order 
It was concluded that Amos had no standing to bring the proceedings, and that Lyons J was correct 
to refuse leave on the ground that there was no prospects of success on the application. The Notice 
of Appeal by Amos was dismissed. 
Comment 
It may be noted that in his decision in Wright, the Chief Justice accepted that under the court order 
Ms Anderson may have a legal obligation to Mr Anderson in respect of the costs, but found this 
insufficient to fall within s 301 of the Act. However, the decision does not specifically consider why 
Ms Anderson was not in consequence a “non-associated third party payer” within subsection (3). 
In Amos, there was no finding of any legal obligation to pay the solicitor’s legal costs. That decision 
does not exclude situations where the liability is owed to someone other than the solicitor, such as a 
mortgagee or lessor: See Boyce v McIntyre [2009] NSWCA 185, where the obligation of a sub-lessee 
to pay legal costs was held to be a legal obligation to pay.  
It should also be noted that in neither case was there any suggestion that the costs charged by the 
solicitors were in fact excessive, or their conduct otherwise inappropriate.  Such circumstances may 
enliven the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, preserved in s 27 of the Legal Profession Act 
2007 (Qld), to control and discipline its officers.  
